The security of digital images attracts much attention recently, and many image encryption methods have been proposed. In IS-CAS2000, a new chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) for image encryption was proposed. This paper points out CKBA is very weak to the chosenhown-plaintext attack with only one plainimage, and its security to brute-force ciphertext-only attack is overestimated by the authors. That is to say, CKBA is not secure at all from cryptographic viewpoint. Some experiments are made to show the feasibility of the chosenknown-plaintext attack. We also discuss some remedies to the original scheme and their performance, and we find none of them can essentially improve the security of CKBA.
INTRODUCTION
In the digital world nowadays, the security of digital images becomes more and more important since the communications of digital products over network occur more and more frequently. Furthermore, special and reliable security in storage and transmission of digital images is needed in many applications, such as pay-TV, medical imaging systems, military image database/communications and confidential video conferencing, etc. In order to fulfill such a task, many image encryption methods have been proposed [1-9] to protect the content of digital images, but some of them [7-91 have been known to be insecure [2, IO] .
In [I] , a chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) for image encryption was proposed, which is a value substitution cipher. This paper estimates its security and points out that known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks can break it with only one knowdchosen plain-image. In addition, its security to brute-force ciphertext-only attack is overestimated by the authors. So CKBA is not secure at all from the strongly cryptographic viewpoint. We also discuss some possible remedies and their performance. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a brief introduction of CKBA is given. Cryptanalytic studies are given in section 3, and the experimental results in section 4. Section 5 discusses some remedies of CKBA and their performance. The last section is the concludes.
CKBA IMAGE ENCRYPTION METHOD
The encryption procedure of CKBA can be briefly depicted as follows. Assume the size of the plain-image is M x N . Select two bytes keyl and key2 (8 bits) and the initial condition x(0) of a one-dimensional chaotic system as the secret keys of the encryption system. Run the chaotic system to make a chaotic sequence {x(i)}~f'"-' (Assume M N 8) Generate a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) {b(i)}T=oN from the 16-bit binary repre-
Once {b(i)} is generated, the encryption can start. For the plain-pixel
, the corresponding cipher-pixel f'(x, y) is determined by the following rule:
where b'(x, y) = 2 x b(l) + b(l + 1) and 1 = x x N + y. The decryption procedure is just like the encryption since XOR and XNOR are both involutive operations Because not all secret keys can make well disorderly cipher-images, the basic criterion to se- 
CRYPTANALYSIS

Ciphertext-Only Attack
The authors of [ I ] claimed that the attack complexity of CKBA since {b(i)}?zN-' has 2MN bits. Actually, such a statement is not true because ofthe fcillowing fact: total 2 M N bits are uniquely determined by the equation of the chaotic system and its initial condition x(O), which has only 16 secret bits. Actually, say, the security of CKBA is overestimated by the authors, even under brute-force attack. Because of the rapid progress of digital computer and distributed arithmetic, the complexity not lower than 2' " is required for a strict cipher, but CKBA can not provide enough security. Without loss of generality, assume M = N = 512 = 2', which is the typical size of a ''large'' digital image, the attack complexity will be only 2" x (MN)' = 263.
Known-Plaintext and Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
Under known-plaintext or chosen-plaintext attack, CKBA can be broken with only one plain-image and its cipher-image. Assume one knows a plain-image f and the corresponding cipher-image f' (both If we want to entirely decrypt a plain-images with larger size, the right secret key K = {keyl, key2, ~( 0 ) ) must be known.
Based on f m , it is rather easy to deduce K-Becausef,only contains four possible gray values: {keyl, keyl, key2, key2} = {kl, kz, k~, k4}, we can find the right keyl and key2 by bruteforce search. The search procedure can be described as the following steps.
Step 1: Assume key1 = k, (form = 1 -4), and key2 = kk,
, where k; and k; are the two possible v a k o f key2 when keyl is determined (the other two are keyl and keyl);
Step 2: Calculate b'(z, y) for all pixels using the following rule:
Step 3: Generate the chaotic orbits {z(i)}flC/"-' from b'(z, y).
Step 4: Verify whether or not {z(i)}:f"-' satisfies the chaotic equation. If the answer is yes, the search procedure stops and output the current keyl, key2 and z(O), which are the right secret keys K . Here please note that we need not calculate the whole chaotic orbit {z(z)}fl:/'-', just two chaotic values z(0) and z( 1) are enough to make correct judgement.
Apparently, the computation complexity from f m to K is chiefly determined by step 2 and 3. Generally speaking, the complexity is O ( M N ) , which approximately equals to the one obtaining f m .
There is another possible method to decrypt any plain-image whose size is larger than the size of the knowdchosen plain-image. When chaotic systems are realized under finite computing precision L, the cycle length of the chaotic orbits will be much smaller than ZL [ 1 1,121. For CKBA, the finite precision L = 16, the cycle length of each chaotic orbit will be much smaller than 216, which is not large enough in comparison with the size of many plainimages. For a 256 x 256 image, the total length of the chaotic orbit { z ( i ) } is M N / 8 = 213, for almost every initial condition z(O), the cycle length of { z ( i ) } is even much smaller than 213. Consequently, it is possible to derive any mask image with larger size from the known mask image f m whose size is about 256 x 256 = 216. That is to say, without extracting the right secret key K , a 256 x 256 mask image fm is enough to decrypt all plain-images. Such a result is supported by our experiments (see the next section and Fig. 4) . Assume the size of the larger plain-image is M' x N', the complexity from f, to fA will be O(M'N' + M N ) , which is a little larger than the one obtaining As we know, the known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks will be very meaningful if a same key is used to encrypt more than one plaintexts, especially in the case that a larger number of plaintexts are all encrypted with a same key [13] . For a "good" cipher, the capability to resist known-plaintext attack is very important and generally needed. It is because of the following fact: the key management will be very complex, inconvenient and inefficient in many applications, if any key must not be used to encrypt more than one plaintexts. Apparently, it is not advisable to apply CKBA to encrypt MPEG video as claimed in [I] . Once one plain-frame in the encrypted MPEG video stream is known for an illegal user, he can easily get all other plain-frames, i.e., the whole video stream. fm.
EXPERIMENTS
To verify the feasibility of the above known-plaintext and chosenplaintext attacks, we give some experimental results in this section. The logistic map is selected as the chaotic system with the control parameter T = 4: ( 1 -I,) .
(3)
The logistic map is realized with 16-bit computing precision a) Lenna.bmp (256 x 256) one 256 x 256 plain-image f (Lenna.bmp) and its cipher-image f' are given in Fig. 1 . We can easily get the mask image fm = f XOR f' (Fig. 2a) .
When the key K is used to encrypt another plain-image with identical size (see Fig. 2 k ) , the plain-image can be directly decrypted by f m (see Fig. 2d ).
When the key K is used to encrypt a larger plain-image (384 x 384, see Fig. 3a-b) , fm can only decrypt M N pixels from the left
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In the last section, we have mentioned another method 10 decrypt larger plain-images. Observe fm (Fig. 2c) obtained from the knowdchosen plain-image Lenna.bmp (256 x 256), we can see some obvious pattern occurs rcpeatedly for 9 times. It means that the cycle length of {z(z)}E:y'8-'is about 216/(8 x 9) = 216/72. As a result, we can easily generate the mask image f& for 384 x 384 plain-images from .fm, which is shown in Fig. 4a .
The decrypted plain-image GirLbmp using f& is shown in Fig. 4b . generated from fm (256 x 256) c) Encrypted Miss.bmp d) Decrypted Miss.bmp by fm Fig. 4 . Cryptanalyze Girl.bmp using f& generated from fm Fig. 2 . Cryptanalyze Miss.bmp using fm
HOW TO IMPROVE CKBA?
In above sections, we have shown CKBA image encryption method is not secure enough to ciphertext-only, known-plaintext and chosenplaintext attacks, from both theoretical and experimental viewpoints. In this section, we will z:tudy some remedies to CKBA and their performance of improving the security of CKBA.
side (see Fig. 3c ). To decrypt the whole plain-image, we can derive the right key K from fm. Using the method described in the last section, we can get keyl = 92, key2 = 36, z(0) = 12830/216, and then the whole plain-image can be decrypted (see Fig. 3d ).
. . The simplest idea to enhance the original encryption scheme is increasing the bit size (n) of keyl and key2, and the one (n') of ~(0). Accordingly, the basic criterion should be changed to cl=,(ai @ d i ) = n/2 I . Such a simply enhanced CKBA will be stronger to ciphertext-only attack. Assume n > 8 and n' > 16, we can calculate the attack complexity is (2"-'/(n'/2)) x (2" x ~, " / " / 2 ) x ( M N )~ = 2n+n'-1/nr x c,"/~ x ( M N )~. m e n n = n' = 32 (consider the fact that 32-bit data is widely used in digital computers) and M = N = 512 = 2', the complexity will be approximately 2123.16. In addition, when n' = 32, the cycle length of ( z ( i ) }~f / " -'
will be large enough for almost all plain-images*, so it will be impossible to generate larger fk from a known fm. However, it can not lower the complexity extracting K from fm, since the complexity is just determined by M and N .
Another remedy is to add the control parameter($ of the employed chaotic system as a secret sub-key. It can only enhance the capability against ciphertext-only attack, because different control parameters will make entirely dilrerent chaotic orbits even when the initial conditions are same. But it can not enhance the security to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks, either. Apparently, fm can still be obtained without knowing the secret control parameter, and then the control ptuameter and the initial condition can be simultaneously extracted from the chaotic orbits. Apparently, they will make the extraction of K from fm more difficult.
But fm is still available to decrypt the plain-image whose size is not much larger than the size of the knowdchosen plain-image, and the complexity ofciphertext-only attack will not be influenced.
To avoid the generation of larger f; from the known fm, larger n' or the floating-point arithmetic is suggested being used to generate {~( i ) }~~'~-~. In Fig. 5 , we show the cipher-image of Lenna.bmp and the mask image under floating-point arithmetic. It can be seen that the mask image and the cipher-image are more disorderly than the ones given in Fig. I b and Fig. 2a . However, the advanced algorithms and floating-point arithmetic need more computation complexity, so the enhanced CKBA will run slower than the original one. To sum up, it is easy to enhance the security of CKBA to ciphertext-only attack, but it is rather difficult to essentially enhance the security to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. In fact, the essential reason of the above known-plaintext and chosenplaintext attacks is the encryption procedure of CKBA (see Eq. (I)). But if we change the encryption procedure, CKBA will become an entirely different encryption scheme.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we point out that the CKBA image encryption method proposed in [I] is not secure enough to the ciphertext-only, knownplaintext and chosen-plaintext attack. Detailed cryptanalytic investigations are given and some experiments are made to verify the feasibility of the knowdchosen-plaintext attack. We also discuss some remedies to the original scheme and their performance, but none of them can essentially improve the security of CKBA. We suggest not using CKBA in any strict applications, except when it can be ensured that any secret key will never been used repeatedly to encrypt more than one plain-images.
